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The Second British Empire: 
The British Empire and the re-emergence of global finance 
 
Ronen Palan 
 
The British Empire was a remarkable empire for many good reasons. First, it belonged to that very 
rare club of empires, which included as far as I can tell only two (the Spanish ‘empire’) in which the 
sun never sets. Indeed, at its peak, the British Empire was the largest formal empire the world had 
ever known. True to size, the British empire extended its power and influence in the 19th century 
over very large tract of lands mostly in Latin and Central America which was formally sovereign but 
colloquially known as the ‘informal empire’. Second, considering its size and wealth, the rapid and 
generally speaking orderly collapse of the British Empire after WWII was even more remarkable. By 
the 1980s, the largest empire the world has ever seen shrank down to contain very few remnants and 
debris, including the United Kingdom, three adjacent Crown territories, Jersey, Guernsey and the 
Island of Man, and fourteen dependent territories, since 2002 called ‘overseas territories’ which 
include some small Caribbean islands, the Malvinas/Falkland Islands, Gibraltar. Collectively these 
overseas territories encompass a population of approximately 260,000 people and a land area of 1.7 
million square kilometer, the vast majority of which constitutes the British Antarctic Territory.  
 A third remarkable fact about the British Empire is that while it disappeared completely 
from most contemporary maps of the world, it remains very much alive in one crucial such map, the 
map of  contemporary international finance. Indeed, the contemporary map of the international 
financial markets is configured principally around two poles. One pole has a distinct British Imperial 
flavor. It consists, first and foremost, of the City of London and includes, in addition, the British 
Crown dependencies of Jersey, Guernsey and the Isle of Man, as well as British Overseas Territories 
of which the most significant are the Cayman Islands, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Turks and 
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Caicos and Gibraltar, and recently independent British colonies such as Hong Kong, Singapore, the 
Bahamas, Cyprus, Bahrain and Dubai.1 This British imperial pole accounted for 39.9% of all 
outstanding international loans and 37.3% of all outstanding international deposits by March 2009 
(see table 2). The other pole consists of a string of mid-size European states known uniquely for 
their welfare provisions as well as for serving as tax havens.  This pole includes the Benelux 
countries, Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg, Ireland, Switzerland, and Austria. This pole 
accounted for 17.3% of all outstanding international loans by March 2009 and 19.4% of all 
outstanding international deposits by March 2009.2 Combined, the two poles account for 
approximately 57% of all international banking assets and liabilities by March 2009. The U.S., in 
contrast, during the same period accounted for 12.4% and 12.9% of all outstanding international 
loans and deposits respectively, and Japan for 4.5% and 3.8%.3  
 The unusual geo-political configuration of the international financial market has so far 
attracted little attention for reasons that are difficult to fathom.4 This is despite the fact that Cayman 
                                                 
1 This pole includes in addition Bermuda, which is the largest captive insurance centre in the world, 
but contains a relatively small banking center, and the more numerous but less significant in terms of impact 
former British colonies in the Pacific. For discussion of Bermuda’s financial center see Crombie, 2008. Pacific 
offshore centers and their relationship to the UK see Sharman and Mistry 2008.  
2  A Survey the eleven best known and most authoritative lists of tax havens of the world found that 
Switzerland is considered as a tax haven by nine of them, Luxembourg and Ireland by eight, the Netherlands 
by two and Belgium and Austria was considered a tax haven until it repealed its stringent bank secrecy law in 
2001 under enormous pressure from the European Union. Nevertheless, Austria is included in this list 
because its financial center grew primarily during the years it served as a tax haven. Switzerland and 
Liechtenstein share a custom union as well as strong political links. Observers tend to treat the two countries 
as a linked financial center. See Kuentzler 2007 for discussion.  
3 The figures are for all international loans and deposits, e.g., which are the figures used commonly 
for ranking international financial centers. See discussion in section one. Aggregate figures for loans and 
deposits in financial centers, which include domestic and international loans and deposits yield very different 
picture. According to McKinsey report the leading centers in terms of aggregate bank deposits in 2008 were 
the emerging economies with US$ 14.3 trillion, followed by the Eurozone with US$ 13.1 trillion and the U.S. 
$12.5 trillion and Japan US$ 11.5 trillion. The McKinsey report does not even devote a separate entry for the 
UK which is classified as one among ‘other mature economies’. See Roxborough et.a., 2009. 
4 The literature on international financial centers typically considers only the UK, US, Japan, 
Switzerland, Germany, France and sometimes Caymans among the leading financial centers. See, for instance, 
See Goetz 2007 and Yeandle et. al., 2005.  For an historical analysis of the emergence of the British imperial 
network of financial centres see author.  
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Islands, for instance, ranked consistently among the largest international financial centers since the 
Bank of International Settlements (BIS) began to produce locational statistics on international 
lending and deposit taking in 1982, and ever since the small islands of Jersey and Guernsey have 
never been too far behind. One possible explanation for the lacunae is that the BIS tends to treat 
British Crown Dependencies as well as British Overseas Territories as independent jurisdictions 
separate from the UK—which they are not, and hence underplays the British link.5  
In this chapter I discuss the exceptional case for resurrection of this ‘Second’ British 
financial Empire out of the ashes of the first. I begin with a broad discussion of the development of 
financial centers, followed by an explanation of how the legacy of the British empire survived in 
modern finance.  
 
I.  Theories of International Financial Centers  
 
                                                 
5 The relationship between the British state and its various dependencies is complex, fluid, and 
appears to have evolved on the basis of tacit understandings between the two sides. Yet, none of them 
possess anything approaching full sovereignty.  Indeed, reports in the British press suggest that the UK may 
have to bail out a number of these tax havens. Jersey, Guernsey and the Island of Man are Crown 
dependencies. They are possessions of the British Crown and, strictly speaking, are not part of the UK or the 
EU. Executive power in the three Channel Islands is exercised by the representatives of the British Crown, 
and hence primarily through the British Home Office. The relationship between the islands and the British 
state has evolved over time and the Islands today possess greater autonomy – although that trend may have 
gone into reverse during the current financial crisis. Le Hérissier 1998 describes the relationship between the 
British State and the Channel Islands as pragmatic, with the UK exercising prudence. In financial matters, 
however, the British Treasury exercises far greater control over the islands than is normally admitted. For 
discussion see also Mitchell and Sikka 2002; Hampton and Christensen 1999. In addition, the UK retains 
responsibilities for fourteen Overseas Territories, 11 of which are permanently populated and remain under 
British sovereignty. The territories are not constitutionally part of the UK, but the UK government maintains 
responsibilities towards them, and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office is the department mainly 
responsible for dealing with them. Among these Overseas Territories, the Cayman Island, Bermuda and 
British Virgin Islands have emerged as very significant OFCs, while Turks, Caicos and Gibraltar are medium-
size centers and Anguilla, Montserrat, and Pitcairn Islands possess insignificant offshore financial centers. See 
NAO 2007 for detail. During and after the G-20 meeting in London, April 2008, the UK government has 
acknowledged its responsibilities for regulation these OFCs.  
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Over the past three decades the concept of the international finance center has been going in and 
out of fashion, but still remains highly contested. Predictably, conceptual debates in this area have 
tended to spill over into empirical arguments about the measurement and ranking of financial 
centers and vice versa. One popular methodology of ranking financial centers is based on the 
headquarters count formula. The theory is that banks and other financial institutions are likely to 
locate their headquarters near where the action is, and hence, headquarter location is indicative of 
the importance of a financial center (Gehrig 2000; Choi, Park and Tschoegl 1996). The headquarter 
formula was particularly popular before the Bank of International Settlements introduced locational 
data in the second quarter of 1982. The data first alerted observers to the importance of offshore 
financial centers, in particular the Caymans Islands, and has been used ever since as the principle 
source of data for measuring and ranking international financial centers.  
Table 1 is based on BIS locational statistics as of March 2009. In addition to the unassailable 
position of London, the table shows that the Cayman Islands, which were in fifth position in 2006, 
were ranked fourth by 2009. The table also shows the importance of other tax havens such as Jersey, 
Guernsey and the Bahamas as international financial centers. Table 2 regroups Table 1 on a thematic 
basis. The exercise reveals a number of interesting trends that are obscured by the conventional 
method of ranking financial centers. The most obvious among them is the role played by the UK’s 
financial center in international finance. The UK consists of the famous Square Mile, Canary Wharf, 
Mayfair and the Home Counties, as well as subsidiary financial centers located on the British Isles, 
such as Edinburgh and Manchester (Yeandle et. al., 2005). UK figures exclude British overseas 
territories which, according to all available reports, are still closely linked to the City of London. If 
we add jurisdictions that are under British control, then the British State accounts for 31% of all 
outstanding international loans and 29.6% of deposits by end-March 2009. With the addition of 
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former colonies such as Singapore, Hong Kong and the Bahamas, the share of British Imperial 
jurisdictions rises to 39.9% and 37.3% respectively. 
 Table 2 contains a significant amount of double counting. I submit, however, that it offers a 
more accurate and honest depiction of the character of the international financial market than Table 
1. Table 2 reveals the overwhelming significance of what I call, the Second British Empire in 
shaping international financial activities. It also reveals, more generally, that the international 
financial market — the market that is supposed to be the most advanced, sophisticated and modern 
— exhibits a preference for small and often somewhat anachronistic polities including the British 
Empire and its remnants, city-states, or European dukedoms and monarchies. Existing theories 
provide little explanation for this. Why is that? 
The modern study of international financial centers may legitimately be considered to have 
originated with the publication of Charles Kindleberger’s seminal study, The Formation of Financial 
Centers (Kindleberger 1974). Kindleberger represents large financial centers as a variant of the 
Marshallian district theory. According to the theory, large financial centers like London or 
Amsterdam, and in the twentieth century, New York and Tokyo, develop organically around the 
major trading centers. In time, the agglomeration of know-how and skills presents centers with an 
unassailable competitive advantage. Nonetheless, in increasingly internationalized financial markets, 
other centers can develop if their governments are prepared to offer alternative methods of cost 
reduction, including liberalized regimes of regulation and taxation.  Kindleberger explains, therefore, 
the development and the geographical spread of international financial centers in terms of a trade-
off between two competing tendencies, market efficiencies and scale economies and geographical 
and informational and discriminatory business practices.   
By the early 1980s, Y.S. Park observed the growth of new types of financial centers 
developing in conjunction with the traditional centers. Park identified four types of international 
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financial centers which he described as ‘primary centers’ such as London or New York. ‘booking 
centers’ such as the Bahamas or the Cayman Islands specializing as ‘registration havens’ for 
Euromarket transactions (Park 1982); ‘funding centers’, such as Singapore or Panama, that tend to 
channel Euromarket funds into regional financial centers, and  ‘collection centers’ like Bahrain that 
are engaged primarily in channeling regional funds into the Euromarket.   
A less elegant, if somewhat more popular theory suggests that OFCs are still primarily 
‘booking centers’, and serve merely as conduits for transactions that are conceived and organized 
elsewhere.6 This may explain why the literature on international financial centers has opted, by and 
large, to ignore the OFC phenomenon, on the grounds that they represent little in terms of genuine 
banking or capital market activity. The view is mirrored by a considerable and growing literature on 
tax havens, which on the whole, has ignored their role and function in the financial system. 
Until recently theories of international financial centers were predicated on the assumption 
that financial centers are in competition with each other. But from the late 1950s, the focus of 
banking shifted from retail to wholesale activity (Lewis and Davis 1987), and subsequently from 
intermediation to risk trading, the relationship between financial centers became more complex and 
competition was supplemented by cooperation. A study commissioned by the Bank of England has 
                                                 
6 Thirty years on, there is still a debate whether leading OFCs such as the Cayman Islands, or Jersey 
have developed genuine financial centers or remain largely booking centers. Many OFCs maintain that they 
have matured into fully functioning financial centers. Yet available data does not lend support to their claims. 
The Cayman Islands’ assets and liabilities are roughly one third of the UK financial center’s (Table 2). Yet 
while the Corporation of the City of London reports 338,000 people working directly in the Square Mile, the 
UK’s National Audit Office reports that only 5,400 people work in the Cayman OFC. The disparity between 
the two figures suggests that either Caymans is exceedingly efficient, or it is still largely a booking center with 
relatively little ‘real’ banking activity. See NAO 2007. The U.S. General Accounting Office’s study into the 
activities of the largest legal firm on the Caymans Islands, Maples and Calder, made famous by Barack 
Obama’s remark: ‘You’ve got a building in the Cayman Islands that supposedly houses 12,000 corporations. 
That’s either the biggest building or the biggest tax scam on record’(  Obama may have given an 
underestimate. GAO reports that ‘the sole occupant of Ugland House is Maples and Calder, a law firm and 
company-services provider that serves as registered office for 18,857 entities it created as of March 2008’ Gao 
2008, 2.GAO concluded that at least 96% of these were effectively of the ‘brass plate’ type of virtual entities. 
In the Netherlands, one building in Amsterdam serves as registered office for 18,857 entities as of March 
2008. See also Lewis and Davis 1987. 
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demonstrated that many OFCs were oriented in their business model to serve London and New 
York’s banking community (Dixon 2001). Similarly, a BIS study acknowledges the increasingly 
cooperative nature of modern international finance arguing that the large international financial 
centers serve nowadays as global hubs of financial activities.  
None of the above offers an explanation for the geo-political character of the international 
financial system as shown in table 2. Aggregative measures and the use of techniques such as 
regression analysis or even more sophisticated statistical techniques in the economist toolkit so far 
provide at best a fuzzy picture. Nevertheless, the consensus appears to be that the traditional model 
of financial centers as agglomerations of banking and financial activities serving the needs of an 
economy has been supplemented by a model of financial centers serving one another. Since such 
behavior does not conform to an idealized notion of the efficiency and utility of financial markets, 
an explanation for such behavior must be sought elsewhere, in externalities such as regulatory 
competition or geographical location, which is where political economic theories come into the 
picture.  
 Alternative theory for the rise of the British pole in the international financial markets is 
based on different interpretation of the techniques of construction of geo-political alliances which 
stresses not universal economic logic, but rather parochial technique of institutional constructions 
that are often driven by opportunistic cost/benefit analysis. According to this perspective, actors 
encounter the world largely as set of opportunities, penalties and rewards. They seek to take 
advantage of opportunities that open to them, and yet avoid penalties in doing so.  A rapidly 
collapsing trading empire such as the British left behind a bloated financial center in the City of 
London that has been traditionally politically powerful. The City contains many competing financial 
institutions, including banks, insurance companies, accounting and legal companies, now left 
stranded without the geo-political umbrella that the British Empire offered them.  They were now 
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desperately searching for new business opportunities, and when one of those opportunities was 
discovered –almost by mistake in 1957 with the emergence of the Euromarkets – then like a pack of 
hyenas, they all poured into the new markets. They soon learned that as British law was applicable in 
other remnants and debris of the empire, in the Caribbean and the pacific islands, they could 
introduce Euromarke operations in these localized communities. City financiers developed these 
remnants into a second British empire not because of a sense of patriotism or even having some 
grand strategic perspective. Rather, they develop these colonies as financial-colonial outposts for 
two related reasons: first, while the City of London was largely unregulated, it was still taxed, and 
heavily so. Crown and overseas territories offered great opportunities for avoiding British tax while 
taking advantage of the British lack of regulation (known euphemistically as ‘self-regulation’). 
Second, as befitting financial actors that have evolved in an empire where the sun never sets, the 
remnants of the former empires in the Caribbean, Asia and the Pacific, offered logistical advantages 
in terms of sharing time zones with other crucial trading centers in the U.S. and Asia. Thus, the City 
of London could become through the British colonial outposts, a 24 hours integrated financial 
center present everywhere in the world. 
 
II.  The Rise of the Euromarket 
 
These opportunistic, sets of considerations are borne out by the history of the modern international 
financial system. It appears that the significant spark, or the historical institutional disturbance, that 
began the process of differentiation among financial centers took place in the late 1950s in London 
in what Philip Cogan described as ‘probably the single most important development in the 
international financial markets since the Second World War’, namely, the Euromarket (Cogan 2002, 
102).   
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Despite its importance, a great deal of confusion surrounds the Euromarket, or as it used to 
be called, the Euro-dollar market. Some very distinguished economists believe that the Euromarket 
is any wholesale financial market, or an inter-bank market, trading in non-resident denominated 
currencies and assets. According to this view, the Euromarket evolved as a system trading in US 
dollars in European markets and took off on the European continent in the mid 1950s (Schenk 
1998; Bryant 1983). In time, the Euromarket has come to denote any market trading in non-resident 
‘hard’ currencies, such as the British Sterling, the Yen, the Swiss Franc, the Deutsche Mark and the 
euro.  
There is a different theory, however, suggesting that the Euromarket is a very specific type 
of market that emerged in late 1957 in London, ironically, for reasons that are directly linked to the 
collapsing empire (Burn 2005). Faced with mounting speculation against the pound after the Suez 
Canal crisis, the British government imposed strict restrictions on the use of sterling in trade credits 
with non-residents. But many City banks, primarily commercial banks, which evolved for more than 
a century as specialists in international lending particularly to British Imperial outposts and the so-
called British informal empire in Latin America, saw their core business disappear overnight. They 
responded by using US dollars in their international dealings arguing to a receptive Bank of England 
(whose deputy, John Bolton, was a banker who headed one of the successful commercial banks 
specializing in central American trade only few years before) that such transactions have no bearing 
on UK balance of payment issues. At this point, the precise policy and legal steps that gave rise to 
the Euromarket become somewhat vague. It appears that the Bank of England has decided without 
consulting the Treasury that it will not intervene in transactions between non-residents and in a 
foreign currency, at that time dollar, but subsequently other currencies entered the same pool. These 
sorts of transactions were interpreted then in the context of the English common law to imply that 
the Bank accounted for certain types of financial transactions between non-resident parties 
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undertaken in foreign currency as if they did not take place in the UK. As these transactions were 
taking place in London, they could not be regulated by any other regulatory authority and ended 
therefore in a regulatory vacuum, which is called the Euromarket, or the offshore financial market 
(Burn 2005; Altman 1969; Hanzawa 1991). 
The Euromarket was therefore an opportunistic development that emerged to sort out a 
specific problem that City banks were facing. Because it was not a planned policy outcome, it 
remained small and practically unknown for about three or four years. By the early 1960s, however, 
US banks, hemmed in by series of New Deal financial legislations, discovered the opportunities that 
London offered them to escape their own financial regulations, and began to set up branches in 
London specializing in Euromarket operations. It soon became clear that the market could be 
employed not only to circumvent an Act of the Bank of England in 1956, but also, crucially, to 
circumvent the very strict capital control regulations that were imposed under the Bretton Woods 
regime. In addition, American banks flocked to the market where they could avoid Regulation Q 
that was introduced in the 1930s. Regulation Q placed an interest rate ceiling on time deposits in 
U.S. banks.7 It kept bank interest rates on time deposits very low, a situation that met with little 
objection from the banks for a long time, but as the world economy began to flourish in the late 
1950s, American banks found themselves at a disadvantage.  
By the early 1960s, the flow of money to the Euromarket became a veritable flood. Then 
crucially, in 1963 the Kennedy administration proposed a tax that achieved exactly the opposite of 
what it intended. It introduced the Interest Equalization Tax, a 15% tax on interest received from 
investments in foreign bonds, in order to make investment in such bonds unattractive to U.S. 
                                                 
7 Regulation Q prohibits member banks from paying interest on demand deposits. See Electronic 
Code of Federal Regulations (e-CFR). The National Recovery Administration, which was set up under the 
New Deal, sought to fix prices in industry in order to eliminate ‘‘ruinous’’ competition, and Regulation Q 
attempted to do the same thing in the banking sector. 
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investors. The tax was supposed to stem the flow of capital out of the United States. In practice, 
American corporations refused to repatriate capital, to avoid paying the interest equalization tax, and 
in the process fueled the growth of the Euromarket.  
 
III. The Euromarket and the Channel Islands  
 
London was able to reduce one crucial fixed cost dimension of trading in incorporeal assets, namely, 
regulation. London seized, in effect, the initiative in the development of the international financial 
markets, to which other states had to respond. That the initiative lay with London, or rather with 
London-based actors, can be seen very clearly in subsequent developments. Contrary to popular 
perception, the US Treasury initially objected to the rise of the unregulated market in London and 
put forward proposals for a new regulatory framework (Kapstein 1994). Failing that, and with the 
active encouragement of the New York banking community, particularly Citibank and Chase, the US 
Treasury came to the conclusion that rather than fight the onset of an unregulated market, the US 
stood to gain by encouraging a domestic variant of the offshore market. A swift volt-face took place 
culminating in the establishment on 3rd of December 1981 of the New York offshore market, the 
New York International Banking Facilities (IBF), which is a more restricted type of London 
offshore. The IBFs were set up as a defensive measure representing ‘an attempt by U.S. government 
regulators to ‘internalize’ the Euromarkets into the U.S. banking system. Japan then followed suit in 
1986 by establishing its own IBF, the Japanese Offshore Market (JOM) (Moffett and Stonehill 1989; 
Hanzawa 1991). 
London’s however, was by then already in the lead. The success of London was built around 
two pillars of strength: an historical concentration of professional and technical know-how in 
international business combined with the rise of the Euromarket in the early 1960s, propelled the 
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City of London into the position of the world’s premier international financial centre. London had, 
however, some disadvantages. First and foremost among them was that while the market was largely 
unregulated or ‘offshore’, banks were subject to corporate taxation. Furthermore, British banks and 
corporations, as opposed to foreign banks, were paradoxically at a disadvantage vis-à-vis foreign 
institutions because they could not pose as non-residents for taxation purposes, whereas American 
banks could take advantage of transfer pricing to ensure low taxation. Third, as the market grew in 
size, the cost of conducting business in London became an issue as well.  
For all or any of these reasons, and since London had in effect emerged as a large and 
flourishing OFC, or a conduit through which bankers, increasingly of American, Japanese and 
German origins, have learned to register financial transaction to avoid various regulations, the idea 
of using other, closely related jurisdictions sharing British law and regulations but with the added 
advantage of low taxation seemed logical. At this juncture it appears that the expansion of the 
Euromarket throughout the globe followed four time-honored institutional precepts: 
A. The process was driven from the centre, by London and New York’s financial, legal and 
accounting firms searching for alternative low-tax locations to ‘book’ transactions in 
order to obtain tax savings; 
B. In their quest for alternative locations, these financial operators, appear to have followed 
a clear geographical path, beginning from those islands nearest to the UK mainland, 
namely, the Channel Islands, soon followed by the British-held Caribbean jurisdictions, 
then Asia and lastly British-held Pacific atolls. The process took about ten years to 
complete.  
C. In expanding operations internationally, London institutions appear to have sought the 
path of least resistance, selecting British imperial polities that broadly resembled the City 
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of London’s unique political structure. As a result, the Euromarket never developed in 
the larger British imperial possessions or dominions such as Canada, India, or Australia, 
but in typically quasi-feudal polities such as the Channel Islands, and other small British 
dependencies. This resulted in a network of British—dominated financial centers with 
close links between them. 
 
IV. Institutional Affinities and the Development of the Euromarket  
 
The remaining bits of empire offered other advantages, including institutional affinities. The City of 
London is a unique political entity, described invariably as quasi-feudal or quasi-democratic. It is 
noteworthy that the City shares many attributes with other remnants of the British Empire, such as 
the Channel Islands, the Caribbean British possessions, Hong Kong (until 1997) or British Pacific 
Islands. The City of London, which used to be called, the Corporation of London, describes itself 
rather modestly as the oldest local authority in England. It plays the role of a local authority within 
the Square Mile, and is responsible for services such as housing, refuse collection, education, social 
services, environmental and health but much, much more. The Corporation of London runs, in fact, 
its own police force, but also two of London’s best loved parks, Epping Forest and Hampstead 
Heath, which are not within the square mile. Most importantly, the voting structure in the City is 
dominated by what is called non-residential business vote.8  The City of London Corporation was 
not reformed, like other UK municipalities, by the Municipal Corporation Act of 1835. As a result, 
eligible voters in the borough are either residents who are 18 years old and citizens of the UK, the 
                                                 
8 The City of London Corporation was not reformed by the Municipal Corporation Act of 1835. 
Eligible voters are either residents,18 years old and citizens of the UK, the Commonwealth or the EU, or sole 
traders or partners in an unlimited partnership or appointees of qualifying bodies. Each body or organization, 
whether incorporated or unincorporated, whose premises are within the City may appoint a number of voters 
based on the number of workers it employs. In fact, qualified voters can vote twice, while residents of the 
City can only vote once. 
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Commonwealth or the EU, or - and this is where the difference with other boroughs comes to light 
-  are sole traders or partners in an unlimited partnership or appointees of qualifying bodies. Each 
body or organization, whether incorporated or unincorporated, with premises in the City may 
appoint a number of voters based on the number of workers it employs. As a result qualified voters 
can vote twice, while residents of the City can only vote once. The City has greatly increased the 
business franchises in 2002 – not sure what this means. Consequently, for all intents and purposes, 
the City of London is run more like a guild in the control of the financial and business interests 
resident in the Square Mile.  
The City elects a Lord Mayor, who plays a significant diplomatic role negotiating both with 
the British State and overseas heads of state, and is supported by a committee of Alderman, nearly 
all of whom are representatives of financial, legal and accounting firms located in the City. The Lord 
Mayor, the committee of Alderman and the entire political structure of the City unashamedly is the 
representative of corporate financial interests.  
The spillover from London to other centers began in early 1960s and followed what appears 
to be a quest for institutional affinities in other centres. Hence the spillover began most naturally 
with British jurisdictions adjacent to the UK, sharing British law, and whose political and 
institutional organizations shared many of the unique political attributes of the City. The Island of 
Jersey was the first to develop as a Euromarket outpost, and is a typical case in point.  
Jersey seemed an obvious starting point for the expansion of City Euromarket operations: it 
shared the UK common law, was protected under the UK’s security umbrella, and used the British 
pound. Labor and real estate costs were much lower than London at the time, although the situation 
has changed dramatically since not least because of the success of Jersey as an offshore financial 
center. Jersey was also known since the 1930s as a tax haven for UK tax exiles. Mark Hampton 
demonstrates very clearly that ‘the emerging offshore centre [in Jersey] was driven by international 
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financial capital, merchant banks, which set up in the island to service certain wealthy customers’ 
(Hampton 2007, 4). London banks took the lead and began to set up subsidiaries in Jersey, 
Guernsey, and the Isle of Man in the early 1960s.  By 1964, the three big American banks - Citibank, 
Chase Manhattan and the Bank of America - arrived on the scene as well (Toniolo 2005, 454).   
The Channel Islands proved attractive, in addition, not least due to their unique semi-feudal 
type of politics, more akin to the politics of the Corporation of London than to modern democracy. 
Austin Mitchell and Prem Sikka described Jersey as a ‘town government writ large, with all its 
intimacies and inefficiencies’ (Mitchell and Sikka, 1999, 40). The island became a possession of the 
British Crown in 1204, the last of the French possessions retained by the British Crown. Executive 
authority resides with the Lieutenant-Governor, who acts as the Crown’s representative on the 
island. In reality, the Lieutenant-governor consults with the States of Jersey and both executive and 
legislative powers lie primarily with the States of Jersey. In that sense, it is largely autonomous.  
  
V.  Second and Third Wave Expansion of the Euromarket  
  
We also know from various reports that faced with the high infrastructural costs of a London base, 
some of the smaller American and Canadian banks ‘realized that the British Caribbean jurisdictions 
offered cheaper and equally attractive regulatory environment – free of exchange controls, reserve 
requirements and interest rate ceilings, and in the same time zone as New York’ (Hudson 1998, 541). 
The Caribbean booking centres had the further advantage of sharing New York’s time zone and 
they were not subject, crucially, to the Act of 1948 – what Act?. They were developed by the North 
American banking community to serve as conduits for Euromarket transactions. 
The OFCs in question were British-held territories. The early spillover into territories such as 
the Bahamas and the Cayman, reckons Sylla, ‘was, like the London Euromarket, not motivated by 
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tax advantages, but because it was cheaper to set up branches in these locations’ (Sylla 2002, 53). 
Bhattacharya also makes an argument based on costs. In 1980 ‘the average annual wages for a 
bookkeeper in the Bahamas are a meager $ 6,000, and the annual fee for an offshore banking 
(Category “B”) license in the Cayman Islands is only $6,098.7 The total cost of operating a branch in 
these islands is much lower than in the primary centers of Eurocurrency operation (Bhattacharya 
1980, 37.)  
Three Caribbean centers, the Caymans, the Bahamas and Bermuda benefited in particular 
from the rapid expansion of the Euromarket, while Bermuda chose a somewhat separate 
developmental path as the world’s premier captive insurance centre. By the late 1970s, the Caribbean 
basin accounted for one fifth of the gross size of total Eurocurrency operations. By the 1980s, US 
bank branches in the Caribbean comprised more than one-third of the assets of all US Foreign bank 
branches in the American region. Yet both Panama and the Bahamas have declined since, while the 
Cayman Islands forged ahead. The reasons are very obviously the British link (Bhattacharya 1980, 
37). The Bahamas opted for independence and was tainted by political scandal and began its decline.  
The theory of social and political affinities may help explain the development of the Asians 
OFCs with strong British links as well.  As the widening Indo-China war in mid 1960’s increased 
foreign exchange expenditure in the region, a tightening of credit occurred in 1967 and 1968, 
contributing to rising interest rates in the Eurodollar market. Tapping existing dollar balances in the 
Asia-pacific region became attractive for many banks. The Bank of America was the first to hit on 
the idea of setting up a specialized facility for Eurodollar operations in East Asia.  
Initially the Bank of America approached the one jurisdiction that shared many of the 
characteristics described above, namely, Hong Kong. The Hong Kong colonial government, 
however, was not particularly forthcoming. It had placed restrictions on the financial sector as far 
back as the early 1950s.  
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Having failed to persuade the Hong Kong government, the Bank of America turned to the 
next available jurisdiction that shares many of the above characteristics. This time an ex British 
colony, Singapore, proved far more accommodating. Singapore responded by setting up in 1968 
facilities, called the Asian Currency Unit (ACU), that provided incentives for branches of 
international banks to relocate to Singapore. Singapore licensed the first branch of the Bank of 
America to set up a special international department to handle transactions for non-residents. As 
with all other Euromarket operations, the ACU created a separate set of accounts in which all 
transactions with non-residents are recorded. Although the ACU was not subject to exchange 
controls, banks were required to submit to the exchange control authority detailed monthly reports 
of their transactions.  In that sense, the ACU is a more restricted type of an offshore financial 
centre.  
 The moratorium on the establishment of new banks in Hong Kong was lifted in 1978 and 
proved a great success. In February 1982, the interest withholding tax on foreign currency deposits 
was abolished. In 1989, all forms of tax on interest were abolished. With the government becoming 
more proactive, by 1995-96, Hong Kong had soon become the second largest OFC in the Asia-
Pacific region, and between the sixth and seventh largest IFC in the world (Jao 1979).  
 
CONCLUSION  
 
 The British ‘second’ empire emerged partly as an accident of history, partly because of the 
traditional role of the City in the first empire. Once an unregulated financial market developed in 
London, it became clear that trading through the small remnants of the empire gave London a 
distinct advantage. The UK was never too keen on making political capital out of these 
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developments, maintaining relatively low key profile in the international arena but always insisting on 
maintaining London’s system of financial self-regulation.  
Whether intentionally or not, the City of London went about dispersing its assets among 
closely linked offshore financial centers – largely in order to achieve what is nowadays 
euphemistically described as ‘tax neutrality’, but in the process it also diffused somewhat the 
perception of power accumulating in London. This has resulted in British-centered networks 
specializing in trading in incorporeal assets that together quietly have shaped and defined the 
international financial market. That the Euromarket proved to be the most significant development 
in international finance in the post-war period is well-known and accepted among scholars on the 
two sides of the Atlantic – yet the link between these developments and theories of state structural 
power and hegemony are somehow missing. Many scholars still believe that the U.S. was the key 
agent driving the trend towards international financial deregulation, which is clearly not the case.  
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Table 1    International Financial Centers, 2010 
External loans and deposits of banks in all currencies vis-à-vis all sectors 
In individual reporting countries, in billion of US dollars, Mar 2010 
 
   
Reporting Countries  Amounts outstanding 
                                    External loans            deposits       combined     % share of total 
      
All countries                        21,497.0           22,883.9           44,380.9 
 
1.  UK   4,417.2 4,691.3   9162.5 20.6 
2.         US   3,274.2            3,364.5              6638.7           14.9 
          (IBF)                                705.6               629.2               1334.8            3.0 
3. Germany  2,965.9            1,262.1               4228.0            9.5 
4.         Caymans  1,554.7            1,617.9               3172.6            7.1 
5. France   1,434.4            1,705.8               3140.2            7.1 
6. Japan   867.5                  932.5               1800.0            4.0 
            (JOM)                         518.0                  199.5                 717.5            1.6 
7.         Switzerland  780.8                  851.8    1632.6            3.7    
8.         Netherlands  694.8                  825.2    1520.0            3.4       
9 Ireland   464.3                  892.8               1357.1            3.0           
10. Singapore  702.2                  659.8               1362.0            3.0 
11..  Luxembourg  567.3                  538.2               1105.5            2.5 
12. Belgium  514.2                  514.8               1029.0            2.3 
13.  Spain   309.3                683.1                 992.4            2.2 
14.  Hong Kong SAR 497.0                  465.0                 962.0            2.2  
15        Bahamas  467.5                  483.7                 951.2            2.2 
16.       Italy   239.4                  585.9                 825.3            1.8  
17.       Canada             386.2                  328.3                 714.5            1.65                  
18.       Austria                        311.8                  184                    495.8            1.1 
19.       Jersey   287.4                  189.8                 477.2            1.0 
20.       Sweden  224.8                  184.6                 409.0            0.92         
21.       Denmark                       163.9                215.1                 379.0            0.85 
22.       Bahrain  179.9                . 174.1                 354.0            0.79 
23.       Guernsey  137.7                  141.8                 279.5            0.63 
 
            Isle of Man  75.3                      57.0                 132.3 
            Cyprus                         57.5                     95.0                  152.5 
  
  
Source: BIS 2010 
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Table 2 International Financial Centers 
 
                                          COMBINED                  % OF TOAL 
ALL COUNTRIES               44,389.0     
 
British Empire +                   23,648.6                                             53.3% 
European Havens 
British Empire 1          17,006.4 38.3% 
British State2           13,224.1                                               29.8 
European Havens3            6,642.2                                               14.9 
City-States4             8,719.8                                               19.6 
US               6,638.7                                              14.9 
4 big European 5                    9,185.9                                               20.7 
 
 
   
 
Source: BIS 2010 
 
  
                                                 
1
 Figures for the British Empire include the UK, Caymans, Singapore, Hong Kong, Bahamas, Jersey, 
Guernsey, Isle of Man 
2
 UK, Caymans, Jersey, Guernsey, Isle of Man 
3
 Switzerland, Netherlands, Ireland, Belgium, Luxembourg, Austria. 
4
 Caymans, Singapore, Hong Kong, Luxembourg, Bahamans, Jersey, Guernsey, Bahrain, Isle of Man 
5
 France, Germany, Italy, Spain 
 
